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Subjects in Experimental Bestshot Games Behave Like Case-Based Players

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  • Youngse Kim

    (Yonsei University)

Abstract

We reexamine subjects' behavior in the sequential best-shot game experiments. In our model, unrnodeled factors including rationality determine players' initial as-pirations and then a modified version of case—based learning process governs sub-sequent adaptations. The paper shows that "satisficing†can explain the actual subjects' adaptive behavior surprisingly welt Precisely, it is shown that the propor-tion of aggregate periods in which plays are consistent with satisficing ranges from 86.0 to 96.25 percent depending on the experimental treatment We also pro-vide an intuitive explanation of why subgame perfection is observed in the bestshot game but not in the ultimatum bargaining, albeit the similarity of equilibrium predictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Youngse Kim, 1997. "Subjects in Experimental Bestshot Games Behave Like Case-Based Players," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 23-38.
    • Handle: RePEc:kea:keappr:ker-199712-13-2-02
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Case-based Decision; Satisficing; Minimal Inconsistency; Minimal Imperfection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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