In Defense of the Articles of Confederation and the Contribution Mechanism as a Means of Government Finance: A General Comment on the Literature
AbstractThe author attempts to dispel several widely held myths regarding government finance under the Articles of Confederation, some of which were reiterated in K. L. Dougherty and M. J. G. Cain (1997). He defends the contribution mechanism as a method of government finance that is superior to direct taxation by the federal government and presents evidence contradicting the belief that revenue collections under the Articles were poor. A proper comparison is with alternatives at that time, such as state tax collections and the federal government's own tax collections under the new U.S. Constitution, both of which were lower than the collection rate from states under the Articles. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 99 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (June)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
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- Wallace Oates, 2005. "Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 349-373, August.
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