Does the Median Voter Model Explain the Size of Government?: Evidence from the States
AbstractDespite an attempt by its own authors, it is difficult to argue that the influential model of the size of government developed by Meltzer and Richard (1981) has had convincing empirical backing. In this paper, the authors adapt that model to a model of state government size. The main testable hypothesis is that as income inequality grows, government size (as measured by the percentage of income devoted to government redistribution) grows. They test the model using panel data from the U.S. states from 1979-91. In contrast to the results found by Meltzer and Richard (1983), the authors find little evidence to support the model. The results are robust to several model specifications and estimation techniques. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 97 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (October)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
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