Strategic Agricultural Trade Policy Interdependence and the Exchange Rate: A Game Theoretic Analysis
AbstractStrategic agricultural trade policy interdependence is modeled using a game theoretic framework. The model distinguishes between the European Community, the United States, and a politically passive rest-of-the-world. Particular emphasis is placed on the effect of the exchange rate on the equilibrium outcome of this game. Without compensatory payments to those with the highest political influence, the results suggest that only modest reform is possible. With compensation, liberalization occurs but free trade is not obtained. Simulations also indicate that the United States gains incentive to reduce protection given a depreciation of the dollar, while incentive to liberalize trade policies decreases as the dollar appreciates. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 88 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (July)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Other versions of this item:
- Kennedy, P. Lynn & von Witzke, Harald & Roe, Terry L., 1994. "Strategic Agricultural Trade Policy Interdependence And The Exchange Rate: A Game Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 51441, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Cemal Atici, 2008. "Political Economy of Agricultural Policies and Environmental Weights," ICER Working Papers 25-2008, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.