This paper analyzes a simple game-theoretic model to highlight the choice of the government between raising its defense expenditures or giving away some 'gifts' to his opponents as a means to defend his position in power. If the government is a Cournot-Nash player, then there is no gift in equilibrium and any increase in the budget will lead to more inefficient defense expenditures. However, if the government is a Stackelberg leader, then he will use the gift as a tool in his policy for staying in power. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 83 (1995) Issue (Month): 1-2 (April) Pages: 173-84 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)