Private peering, transit and traffic diversion
AbstractPrivate peering refers to settlement-free connectivity agreements between Internet Service Providers meant to interconnect their networks by-passing congested National Access Points. We explore the incentives for bilateral peering with particular emphasis on traffic diversion. A private peering agreement between two providers improves the quality of both and would divert traffic from third parties. This provides an incentive for peering. A three-player model is introduced and analyzed. Complication introduced by price competition and heterogeneous consumers are also studied. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal NETNOMICS: Economic Research and Electronic Networking.
Volume (Year): 7 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102537
peering; transit; internet service providers; C7; L14;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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