Indirect information exchange
AbstractThe goal of this paper is to show that when agents can engage in second-hand trading of information, some agents may not be able to exchange their information with other agents. With three agents, such foreclosure is possible only when agents can refuse to exchange information. With four or more players, foreclosure is possible even when players cannot abstain from or refuse to trade, but it does not constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium. Players can avoid being foreclosed by choosing what to trade and with whom. The results can be applied to formal and informal information sharing, file sharing systems and peer-to-peer networks. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal NETNOMICS: Economic Research and Electronic Networking.
Volume (Year): 6 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102537
information exchange; information sharing; networks; peer-to-peer; reciprocity;
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Schwartz, Michael & Hornych, Christoph, 2010. "Informal networking: An overview of the literature and an agenda for future research," Jena Contributions to Economic Research 2010,1, University of Applied Sciences Jena, Department of Business Administration.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.