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Ordinal Independence in Nonlinear Utility Theory

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Author Info
 Green, Jerry R
Jullien, Bruno

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Abstract

Individual behavior under uncertainty is characterized using a new axiom, ordinal independence, which is a weakened form of the von Neumann-Morgenstern independence axiom. It states that if two distributions share a tail in common, then this tail can be modified without altering the individual's preference between these distributions. Preference is determined by the tail on which the distributions differ. This axiom implies an appealing and simple functional firm for a numerical representation of preferences. It generalizes the form of anticipated utility, and it explains some well-known forms of behavior, such as the Friedman-Savage paradox, that anticipated utility cannot. Copyright 1988 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.

Volume (Year): 1 (1988)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 355-87
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Handle: RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:1:y:1988:i:4:p:355-87

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  1. Olivier L'Haridon & Laetitia Placido, 2008. "An allais paradox for generalized expected utility theories?," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(19), pages 1-6. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ulrich Schmidt, 2001. "Lottery Dependent Utility: a Reexamination," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 35-58, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Caplin, Andrew & Leahy, John, 1997. "Psychological Expected Utility Theory and Anticipatory Feelings," Working Papers 97-37, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Rolf Aaberge & Magne Mogstad, 2009. "On the Measurement of Long-Term Income Inequality and Income Mobility," ICER Working Papers 09-2009, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  5. G. Carlier & R. Dana, 2008. "Two-persons efficient risk-sharing and equilibria for concave law-invariant utilities," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 189-223, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Zimper, Alexander, 2004. "On the Existence of Strategic Solutions for Games with Security- and Potential Level Players," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-04, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
  7. Enrico Diecidue & Ulrich Schmidt & Horst Zank, 2006. "Parametric Weighting Functions," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0622, Economics, The University of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
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  8. H Zank, 2004. "Deriving Rank-Dependent Expected Utility Through Probabilistic Consistency," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0409, Economics, The University of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
  9. Alexander Zimper, 2007. "Strategic games with security and potential level players," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 53-78, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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