Elicitation of Subjective Probabilities When the Initial Endowment is Unobservable
AbstractIn the framework of subjective expected utility theory we develop two distinct procedures for the elicitation of a person's subjective probabilities when the initial endowment is random and unobservable. Procedures of the first kind rely on the boundedness of the utility function to elicit the person's subjective probabilities directly. Procedures of the second kind infer the person's initial endowment from his choice behavior prior to the application of probability elicitation. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.
Volume (Year): 18 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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- Armantier, Olivier & Treich, Nicolas, 2013.
"Eliciting beliefs: Proper scoring rules, incentives, stakes and hedging,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 17-40.
- Armantier, Olivier & Treich, Nicolas, 2010. "Eliciting Beliefs: Proper Scoring Rules, Incentives, Stakes and Hedging," TSE Working Papers 10-156, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
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- Armantier, Olivier & Treich, Nicolas, 2010. "Eliciting Beliefs: Proper Scoring Rules, Incentives, Stakes and Hedging," IDEI Working Papers 643, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Terrance Hurley & Jason Shogren, 2005. "An Experimental Comparison of Induced and Elicited Beliefs," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 169-188, January.
- Li Hao & Daniel Houser, 2012. "Belief elicitation in the presence of naïve respondents: An experimental study," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 161-180, April.
- Alvaro Sandroni & Eran Shmaya, 2013. "Eliciting Beliefs by Paying in Chance," Discussion Papers 1565, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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