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Guaranteed Renewability in Insurance

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Author Info
Pauly, Mark V
Kunreuther, Howard
Hirth, Richard
Abstract

We propose a guaranteed renewability (GR) insurance in which a sequence of premiums would enable insurers to break even and would be chosen by both low- and high-risk buyers, whether or not they had suffered a loss. The premium schedule would continually decline over time, as the insurer collects more information to determine who the low-risk individuals leave for the spot market. The concluding portion of the article discusses the limitations of a GR policy in the health and environmental liability area, the most serious being instability in estimates of underlying loss trends. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.

Volume (Year): 10 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 143-56
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:10:y:1995:i:2:p:143-56

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100299

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  1. Igal Hendel & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2000. "The Role of Commitment in Dynamic Contracts: Evidence from Life Insurance," NBER Working Papers 7470, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Hans van Kippersluis & Tom van Ourti & Owen O'Donnell & Eddy van Doorslaer, 2008. "Health and Income across the Life Cycle and Generations in Europe," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-009/3, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  3. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry & Amir Sufi, 2005. "Dynamic Inefficiencies in Insurance Markets: Evidence from long-term care insurance," NBER Working Papers 11039, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. H. Shelton Brown & Luke B. Connelly, 2005. "Market failure in long-term private health insurance markets: a proposed solution," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 12(5), pages 281-284, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Keith J. Crocker & John R. Moran, 2002. "Contracting with Limited Commitment: Evidence from Employment-Based Health Insurance Contracts," Center for Policy Research Working Papers 45, Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University. [Downloadable!]
  6. Volker Meier, 2003. "Efficient Transfer of Aging Provisions in Private Health Insurance," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  7. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry & Amir Sufi, 2005. "Dynamic Inefficiencies in Insurance Markets: Evidence from Long-Term Care Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 224-228, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Hanming Fang & Alessandro Gavazza, 2007. "Dynamic Inefficiencies in Employment-Based Health Insurance System Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 13371, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-7-1.


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