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Board monitoring efficiency and the value of conservative accounting

Author

Listed:
  • Yanmin Gao

    (Thompson Rivers University)

  • Alfred Wagenhofer

    (University of Graz)

Abstract

This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the observation that firms with strong corporate governance exhibit more conservative accounting. We study one of a board’s most important decisions: to retain or replace the incumbent manager. The board uses accounting information and additional information from costly board monitoring. We show that if the accounting information is useful only for the replacement decision, then conservatism is harmful because it leads to too much replacement. If accounting information is relevant for the board’s decision whether to monitor, then conservatism is beneficial when the board is a sufficiently efficient monitor. We also provide several predictions for empirical tests.

Suggested Citation

  • Yanmin Gao & Alfred Wagenhofer, 2021. "Board monitoring efficiency and the value of conservative accounting," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 25(2), pages 321-345, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:25:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s10997-020-09524-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10997-020-09524-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Paweł Mielcarz & Dmytro Osiichuk & Karolina Puławska, 2023. "Increasing shareholder focus: the repercussions of the 2015 corporate governance reform in Japan," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 27(3), pages 1017-1047, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conservative accounting; Corporate governance; Board of directors; Board monitoring; Management replacement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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