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Dynamic Incentive Contracts in Multiple Penalty Systems with No-commitment to Tenure-track Auditing

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  • Hsiao-Chi Chen
  • Shi-Miin Liu

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Suggested Citation

  • Hsiao-Chi Chen & Shi-Miin Liu, 2007. "Dynamic Incentive Contracts in Multiple Penalty Systems with No-commitment to Tenure-track Auditing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 255-294, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:90:y:2007:i:3:p:255-294
    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-006-0241-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Avner Bar-Ilan & Bruce Sacerdote, 2001. "The Response to Fines and Probability of Detection in a Series of Experiments," NBER Working Papers 8638, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Polinsky, A. Mitchell, 2006. "Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 323-335, September.
    3. Arguedas, C., 2005. "Pollution Standards, Costly Monitoring and Fines," Other publications TiSEM 25389e6d-8a88-4063-a490-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Han, Wenqing & Liu, Shi-Miin & Chen, Hsiao-Chi, 2020. "Optimal concession contracts for landlord port authorities under incomplete information," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 113-127.
    2. Hsiao-Chi Chen & Shi-Miin Liu & Chiung-Yun Chang, 2013. "Commitment or no-commitment to monitoring in emission tax systems?," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 15(2), pages 171-188, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    dynamic incentive contract; tenure-track auditing; penalty schemes; C70; D82;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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