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External Monitoring and Enforcement and the Success of Collective Property Rights Regimes

Author

Listed:
  • Felipe J. Quezada

    (University of California Santa Cruz)

  • Nathan W. Chan

    (University of Massachusetts Amherst)

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze how public monitoring and enforcement (M&E) efforts affect the success of a collective property right. We develop a bioeconomic model to generate several theoretical predictions, which we test empirically by assembling and analyzing novel data on public patrolling and fishing activity in the Chilean abalone fishery. Consistent with our model, we find robust evidence that patrolling increases abalone stocks and harvest for nearby fishers’ organizations. In our preferred (conservative) specifications, a 10% increase in patrolling increases stock density by 0.95% and harvest by 1.2%, which translates roughly to an increase in annual revenues of 6770 USD on average within a port captainship jurisdiction. Our work provides new empirical evidence on the determinants of success for collective property rights regimes, revealing the pivotal role that public M&E can play in helping sustain these institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Felipe J. Quezada & Nathan W. Chan, 2024. "External Monitoring and Enforcement and the Success of Collective Property Rights Regimes," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 87(3), pages 605-628, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:87:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s10640-023-00828-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-023-00828-9
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Common pool resources; Collective property right; Monitoring and enforcement; Territorial use rights for fishing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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