The expected restructuring of Asian corporations in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis has not materialized. This paper argues that restructuring in Asia will depend upon two institutional changes. First, the creation of high quality institutions that promotes the growth of new entrants and provides incentives to incumbents to restructure and or exit. Second, that the market scope of dominant incumbents be confronted and limited. The first condition creates pathways for new organizational populations to enter the economy and the second ensures room for their growth. The current debate emphasizes the former but neglects the latter. The absence of either inhibits the rate and direction of restructuring for two reasons. First, incumbents may lack the incentive and ability to exit or transform their structures and, secondly, incumbents can create a 'blocking coalition' to diminish competition from new entrants.
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Volume (Year): 21 (2004) Issue (Month): 1_2 (03) Pages: 171-188 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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