This paper analyzes the financial incentives for entities to self-impose punishments post-apprehension but before the enforcement body imposes punishment. We argue that violators punish themselves in order to affect the level and type of total punishment. Violators may be able to choose the punishment that minimizes lost revenue. The model includes an enforcing body whose objective is to be perceived as fair by the public. We consider the case of university self-sanctions for National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) violations to test our self-punishment model using data from Division I schools’ major infractions of NCAA rules. The estimation results show that university self-imposed punishments can significantly affect the form or type of the final punishment they receive from the NCAA in response to a violation of NCAA rules.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 3 (2008) Issue (Month): 4 (November) Pages: 196-209 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF