A Theoretical Model on the Influence in Chain Stores of Buyer Power
AbstractThis thesis introduces the "buyer power" model, probes into the influence on the chain relationship of the growth and decline of power between the headquarters and chain stores, and further overthrows the traditional literature's argument on the cause of exclusive dealing. First, this paper discovers that the unit remuneration demanded by a chain store from its headquarters is certainly in a reverse relationship with buyer power. Secondly, the effect of social welfare is dependent on the horizontal differentiation of the consumption aspect; while the horizontal differentiation is at a medium-low level, the market mechanism and social decision maker's preference regarding buyer power will be identical. Finally, this paper discovers that the crux of the problem is not in the concerned focus of the argument "market share", but rather below the two items are the real causes of exclusive dealing: (1) the compulsory contract between the headquarters and chain stores, and (2) the ratio of the headquarters' revenue to the chain store's fixed cost.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by College of Business, Feng Chia University, Taiwan in its journal Journal of Economics and Management.
Volume (Year): 8 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
chain store; buyer power; exclusive dealing;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jui-Fen Lin).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.