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The Effect of Communicating Normative Reputation on the Benefits of Resource Sharing in Simple Societies

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  • Stephen Younger

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    Abstract

    Discrete agent simulation was used to study the role of reciprocity and normative reputation in the development of mutual obligation in gift-giving societies. Measures of economic and non-economic rewards were tracked over many generations of agents acting within a fixed environment and according to a constant behavioral rule set. Communicating normative reputation enabled potential victims to avoid theft without the necessity of personally experiencing the character of every agent. It also optimized mutual obligation among agents, even among aggressive agents. Communicating normative reputation was found to be most important in societies lacking social structure and was less influential in social clusters where agents frequently and directed experienced the character of other agents. These results are discussed in the context of theories of positive and negative reciprocity and are related to observations of some hunter-gatherer societies.

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    File URL: http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/7/1/5.html
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation in its journal Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation.

    Volume (Year): 7 (2004)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 5

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    Handle: RePEc:jas:jasssj:2003-35-3

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    Keywords: reciprocity; normative reputation; mutual obligation; gift-giving societies;

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