IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/jas/jasssj/2000-5-1.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

When One Decides for Many: the Effect of Delegation Methods on Cooperation in Simulated Inter-Group Conflicts

Author

Listed:
  • Ramzi Suleiman
  • Ilan Fischer

Abstract

The study explores the evolution of decision strategies and the emergence of cooperation in simulated societies. In the context of an inter-group conflict, we simulate three different institutions for the aggregation of attitudes. We assume that: (a) the conflict can be modeled as an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma played by two decision makers, each representing her group for a fixed duration; (b) the performance of each group's representative influences her group members and, consequently, her prospects to be reelected. Our main objectives are: (1) to investigate the effects of three power-delegation mechanisms: Random Representation, Mean Representation, and Minimal Winning Coalition representation, on the emergence of representatives' decision strategies, (2) to investigate the effect of the frequency of elections on the evolving inter-group relations. Outcomes of 1080 simulations show that the emergence of cooperation is strongly influenced by the delegation mechanism, the election frequency, and the interaction between these two factors.

Suggested Citation

  • Ramzi Suleiman & Ilan Fischer, 2000. "When One Decides for Many: the Effect of Delegation Methods on Cooperation in Simulated Inter-Group Conflicts," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 3(4), pages 1-1.
    • Handle: RePEc:jas:jasssj:2000-5-1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/3/4/1.html
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jas:jasssj:2000-5-1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Francesco Renzini (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.