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Incentivized Actions in Freemium Games

Author

Listed:
  • Lifei Sheng

    (College of Business, University of Houston-Clear Lake, Houston, Texas 77058)

  • Christopher Thomas Ryan

    (Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z2, Canada)

  • Mahesh Nagarajan

    (Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z2, Canada)

  • Yuan Cheng

    (School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China)

  • Chunyang Tong

    (School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China)

Abstract

Problem definition : Games are the fastest-growing sector of the entertainment industry. Freemium games are the fastest-growing segment within games. The concept behind freemium is to attract large pools of players, many of whom will never spend money on the game. When game publishers cannot earn directly from the pockets of consumers, they employ other revenue-generating content, such as advertising. Players can become irritated by revenue-generating content. A recent innovation is to offer incentives for players to interact with such content, such as clicking an ad or watching a video. These are termed incentivized (incented) actions. We study the optimal deployment of incented actions. Academic/practical relevance : Removing or adding incented actions can essentially be done in real-time. Accordingly, the deployment of incented actions is a tactical, operational question for game designers. Methodology : We model the deployment problem as a Markov decision process (MDP). We study the performance of simple policies, as well as the structure of optimal policies. We use a proprietary data set to calibrate our MDP and derive insights. Results : Cannibalization—the degree to which incented actions distract players from making in-app purchases—is the key parameter for determining how to deploy incented actions. If cannibalization is sufficiently high, it is never optimal to offer incented actions. If cannibalization is sufficiently low, it is always optimal to offer. We find sufficient conditions for the optimality of threshold strategies that offer incented actions to low-engagement users and later remove them once a player is sufficiently engaged. Managerial implications : This research introduces operations management academics to a new class of operational issues in the games industry. Managers in the games industry can gain insights into when incentivized actions can be more or less effective. Game designers can use our MDP model to make data-driven decisions for deploying incented actions.

Suggested Citation

  • Lifei Sheng & Christopher Thomas Ryan & Mahesh Nagarajan & Yuan Cheng & Chunyang Tong, 2022. "Incentivized Actions in Freemium Games," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 24(1), pages 275-284, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormsom:v:24:y:2022:i:1:p:275-284
    DOI: 10.1287/msom.2020.0923
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