IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormnsc/v16y1970i9p542-559.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Game Theoretic Analysis of a Problem of Government of People

Author

Listed:
  • T. S. Chidambaram

    (Department of Operations Research, Case Western Reserve University)

Abstract

The general problem of control of a set of individuals to achieve the objective of a controller is common to many areas such as business and government. This paper attempts a mathematical formulation and analysis of such problems. It is assumed that each individual is a rational being acting in his own self-interest. The interests of different individuals are, in general, conflicting, thus leading to a competitive situation which can be analyzed using Game Theory notions. An important aim of mathematical analysis of such a situation will be to study the effectiveness of various kinds of power that a controller might have over the individuals. Most of the results in this paper are concerning a class of "coordination problems" where the controller's objective is to maximize the total utility to the whole group of individuals and where competition arises due to constraints on strategies. The analysis indicates that in such cases the simple power to accept or reject strategies which violate the constraints may be sufficient to realize the controller's goals.

Suggested Citation

  • T. S. Chidambaram, 1970. "Game Theoretic Analysis of a Problem of Government of People," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 16(9), pages 542-559, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:16:y:1970:i:9:p:542-559
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.16.9.542
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.16.9.542
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1287/mnsc.16.9.542?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:16:y:1970:i:9:p:542-559. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.