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Regulador No Benevolente y Asimetrias de Informacion. Aproximacion con un Modelo de Agencia

Author

Listed:
  • Lourdes Marcela Espinoza Vasquez

    (Universidad Católica Boliviana)

  • Raúl Rubin de Celis Cedro

    (Universidad Católica Boliviana)

Abstract

This document presents a theoretical model of a non-benevolent regulator and cost heterogeneous operators where the objective function to be maximized, besides considering consumers' and producers' surpluses, includes rent seeking from at least one of the operators that directly benefits the regulator. Under these conditions, the resulting regulatory contract complies with individual rationality and incentive compatibility; however, it introduces distortions that affect the most efficient operators resulting in costs to society as a whole. The main results from this model point towards the need to evaluate the relevance of maintaining regulation under such settings.

Suggested Citation

  • Lourdes Marcela Espinoza Vasquez & Raúl Rubin de Celis Cedro, 2017. "Regulador No Benevolente y Asimetrias de Informacion. Aproximacion con un Modelo de Agencia," Revista de Analisis Economico – Economic Analysis Review, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business, vol. 32(1), pages 23-45, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:ila:anaeco:v:32:y:2017:i:1:p:23-45
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Benevolent regulator; optimal prices; information asymmetries; incentive compatibility; participation constraint;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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