Saving Dolphins: Boycotts, Trade Sanctions, And Unobservable Technology
AbstractConsumers boycott some goods because they do not approve the ways they are manufactured. I examine the efficacy of boycotts and the role of trade policy in influencing the foreign exporter's technology choice. Even when its technology choice is unobservable, boycott threats can prompt the foreign firm to adopt the technology consumers prefer. Import policy can augment this effect, but when boycotts can have a substantial impact on demand, a use of ad valorem tariffs yields the unintended result. Specific tariffs and quotas are free of this defect, but specific tariffs are more effective than quotas in addressing consumers' concern. Copyright � (2009) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 50 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
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Other versions of this item:
- Kaz Miyagiwa, 2004. "Saving Dolphins: Boycotts, Trade Sanctions, and Unobservable Technology," Emory Economics 0417, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Thomas J. Prusa & Dobrin Kolev, 1999.
"Dumping and Double Crossing: The (In)Effectiveness Of Cost-Based Trade Policy Under Incomplete Information,"
Departmental Working Papers
199901, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Dobrin R. Kolev & Thomas J. Prusa, 2002. "Dumping and Double Crossing: The (In)Effectiveness of Cost-Based Trade Policy under Incomplete Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(3), pages 895-918, August.
- Dobrin R. Kolev & Thomas J. Prusa, 1999. "Dumping and Double Crossing: The (In)Effectiveness of Cost-Based Trade Policy Under Incomplete Information," NBER Working Papers 6986, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Tomomichi Mizuno & Kazuhiro Takauchi & Takeshi Iida, 2011. "Better technology may be sold for a lower fee: The ad valorem tariff and licensing contract," Discussion Papers 1109, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
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