Rotating Savings and Credit Associations When Participants are Risk Averse
AbstractWe model rotating savings and credit associations (Roscas) among risk-averse participants who experience privately observed income shocks. A random Rosca is not advantageous, whereas a bidding Rosca is if temporal risk aversion is less pronounced than static risk aversion. The payoff scheme of a bidding Rosca facilitates risk sharing in the presence of information asymmetries. The risk-sharing performance of a simple arrangement where a group of homogenous individuals runs several bidding Roscas simultaneously is as good as that of a linear risk-sharing contract, and is more enforceable because it carries a fixed rather than a variable contribution. Copyright 2003 By The Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 44 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
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