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Monopoly Price Dispersion under Demand Uncertainty

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  • Dana, James D, Jr

Abstract

When a monopolist sets its price before its demand is known, then it may set more than one price and limit the availability of its output at lower prices. This article adds demand uncertainty and price rigidities to the standard model of monopoly pricing. When there are two states of demand and the ex post monopoly price is greater when demand is high then the monopolist's optimal ex ante pricing strategy is to set two prices and limit purchases at the lower price.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 42 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 649-70

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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:42:y:2001:i:3:p:649-70

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Cited by:
  1. Chernonog, Tatyana & Avinadav, Tal, 2014. "Profit criteria involving risk in price setting of virtual products," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 236(1), pages 351-360.
  2. BELLEFLAMME, Paul & LAMBERT, Thomas & SCHWIENBACHER, Armin, 2011. "Crowdfunding: tapping the right crowd," CORE Discussion Papers 2011032, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Seongman Moon & Makoto Watanabe, 2011. "Refundability and Price: Empirical Analysis on the Airline Industry," Working Papers 1107, Research Institute for Market Economy, Sogang University.
  4. Siegert, Caspar & Ulbricht, Robert, 2014. "Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing: Evidence from the Airline Industry," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 463, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  5. Humphreys, Brad R. & Soebbing, Brian P., 2012. "A test of monopoly price dispersion under demand uncertainty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 304-307.
  6. Marco Cornia & Kristopher S. Gerardi & Adam Hale Shapiro, 2010. "Consumer Heterogeneity and Markups over the Business Cycle: Evidence from the Airline Industry," BEA Working Papers 0056, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
  7. Benjamin Eden & Matthew Jaremski, 2009. "Rigidity, Dispersion and Discreteness in Chain Prices," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0903, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  8. Volker Nocke & Martin Peitz, 2003. "Monopoly Pricing under Demand Uncertainty: Final Sales versus Introductory ffers," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-002, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  9. Khouja, Moutaz & Robbins, Stephanie S., 2005. "Optimal pricing and quantity of products with two offerings," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 163(2), pages 530-544, June.
  10. Korbinian Blanckenburg & Alexander Geist, 2011. "Detecting illegal activities: the case of cartels," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 15-33, August.
  11. Rosato, Antonio, 2013. "Selling Substitute Goods to Loss-Averse Consumers: Limited Availability, Bargains and Rip-offs," MPRA Paper 47168, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Daniel, Rascher & Andrew, Schwarz, 2010. "Illustrations of Price Discrimination in Baseball," MPRA Paper 25807, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Nocke, Volker & Peitz, Martin, 2008. "Advance-Purchase Discounts as a Price Discrimination Device," CEPR Discussion Papers 6664, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Khouja, Moutaz & Smith, Michael Alan, 2007. "Optimal pricing for information goods with piracy and saturation effect," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 176(1), pages 482-497, January.
  15. Xiao, Tiaojun & Yang, Danqin, 2008. "Price and service competition of supply chains with risk-averse retailers under demand uncertainty," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 187-200, July.
  16. Chen, Yongmin & Zhang, Tianle, 2014. "Interpersonal Bundling," MPRA Paper 56165, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Stole, Lars A., 2007. "Price Discrimination and Competition," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier.
  18. Claudio A. Piga & Enrico Bachis, 2006. "Pricing strategies by European traditional and low cost airlines. Or, when is it the best time to book on line?," Discussion Paper Series 2006_14, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Jul 2006.
  19. Philippe Choné & Romain De Nijs & Lionel Wilner, 2012. "Intertemporal Pricing with Unobserved Consumer Arrival Times," Working Papers 2012-23, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.

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