Complementarity and Substituability in Multiple-Risk Insurance Markets
AbstractWe study imperfect competition between insurers in a multiple-risk environment. In the absence of asymmetric information, equilibria are efficient, and we determine the degrees of specialization under which the specialized insurers are able or unable to capture the surplus. We show in contrast that under adverse selection, specialization systematically prevents second-best efficiency. Concluding on the role of our notions of strategic complementarity/substitutability on the tradeoff between efficiency and fairness of the allocation, we give indications on the desirable structure of the insurance industry.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 42 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Other versions of this item:
- Koehl, Pierre-François & Villeneuve, Bertrand, 2001. "Complementarity and Substituability in Multiple-Risk Insurance Markets," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/5355, Paris Dauphine University.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
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- Georges Dionne & Nathalie Fombaron & Neil Doherty, 2012. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1231, CIRPEE.
- Villeneuve, Bertrand, 2003.
"Concurrence et antisélection multidimensionnelle en assurance,"
Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine
123456789/5370, Paris Dauphine University.
- Bertrand VILLENEUVE, 2003. "Concurrence et antisélection multidimensionnelle en assurance," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 69, pages 119-142.
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