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Bertrand-Edgeworth Duopoly with Proportional Residual Demand

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Author Info
Allen, Beth
Hellwig, Martin

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Abstract

A complete characterization is given for the prices charged by Bertrand-Edgeworth duopolists with capacity constraints. In general, for the game in which firms' strategy spaces consist of price offers, Nash equilibrium involves nondegenerate mixed strategi es. Equilibria never extend below the highest competitive price. With tw o firms, the Bertrand-Edgeworth model displays a bias for the highest of several market clearing prices. Moreover, these strategies never stop short of the lowest monopoly price. If firms are of unequal siz e, the larger firm assigns positive probability to a monopoly price, possibly even to several monopoly prices. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 34 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 39-60
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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:34:y:1993:i:1:p:39-60

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  1. Maxim Sinitsyn, 2007. "Characterization Of The Support Of The Mixed Strategy Price Equilibria In Oligopolies With Heterogeneous Consumers," Departmental Working Papers 2007-08, McGill University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2007. "Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium with a large number of firms," MPRA Paper 3353, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Hirata, Daisuke, 2008. "Bertrand-Edgeworth Equilibrium in Oligopoly," MPRA Paper 7946, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. G. Chiesa, 2001. "Competition and Regulation in Banking," Working Papers 397, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
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