Democracy and exchange rate regime choice
Abstract
This paper takes a new look at the relationship between democracy and exchange rate regimes. Evidence from a cluster analysis and a panel analysis suggests that democracies are not all equally likely to float their exchange rates. While democracies are more likely to float than autocracies are, established democracies are more likely to choose a fixed exchange rate regime because they are better able than transition democracies to make the credible commitments needed for a cooperative arrangement. More established democracies are more able to join cooperative arrangements that allow them to make a less constrained choice between floating and fixing.Download Info
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Inderscience Enterprises Ltd in its journal International Journal of Trade and Global Markets.
Volume (Year): 1 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (January)
Pages: 339-354
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://inderscience.metapress.com/link.asp?target=journal&id=120861
Related research
Keywords: democracy; transition democracies; exchange rates; cluster analysis; transition economies;References
No references listed on IDEASYou can help add them by filling out this form.
Citations
Lists
This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ids:ijtrgm:v:1:y:2008:i:4:p:339-354For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ian Winship) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.