Agency creation as an instrument of rent-seeking in South Sudan

The paper, analysing secondary data and case studies of select events, focuses on instruments that economic agents have used to extract rents from the state in South Sudan. Invoking a simplified conceptual framework nested in the rent-seeking theory, it finds that agency creation, a profound penchant to form new institutions, was not confined but widespread across the government in the period 2005-2016. In furthering the agency creation hypothesis, the paper argues that institutional weaknesses, mostly in the public sector, and oil bonanza have enabled economic actors to bring about innovations in the rent-seeking market in which individual agents, including importers, well-connected elites and members of public created or chose existing government agencies as instruments to capture rents. The paper concludes by urging more vigilance in addressing agency creation or shopping, either of which is more pronounced where institutions are weak, with resource abundance creating opportunities for rent-seeking.