Antonio García Lorenzo () (Universidad de A Coruña) Javier Prado Domínguez () (Universidad de A Coruña)
Abstract
In this work we present a model basis on Bernheim-Whinston model, which considers that political decisions are the result of various interactions between groups with direct influence (GDI) on political decision making. According to our approach, this model stokes up government role which consists in to strengthen not only the competitiveness amongst lobbies which occurs in an flawed market and non-market and political framework, but also in the creation of counterweight power among the aforementioned lobbies, therefore a explicit regulation is required to give an efficient response to rapid politician market changes.
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Volume (Year): 176 (2006) Issue (Month): 1 (April) Pages: 73-85 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government