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Coordinación Y Búsqueda De Normas: Un Enfoque Desde La Teoría De La Elección Pública

Author

Listed:
  • José Casas Pardo

    (Universidad de Valencia)

  • Juan de Dios Montoro Pons

    (Universidad de Valencia)

  • José Casas Pardo

    (Universidad de Valencia)

Abstract

The present paper analyzes competitive coordination games from a public choice approach. In these, agents may engage in a rent-seeking competition for norms, which redefines property rights and has redistributive effects. For a binary population, the work shows that rent dissipation will depend on the asymmetry of the payoffs, the returns of the rent-seeking activities and on the population distribution. The main conclusion is that, under plausible conditions, the rent dissipation will not be perfect. Classification-JEL : D72

Suggested Citation

  • José Casas Pardo & Juan de Dios Montoro Pons & José Casas Pardo, 2001. "Coordinación Y Búsqueda De Normas: Un Enfoque Desde La Teoría De La Elección Pública," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 159(4), December.
    • Handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2001:v:159:i:4:a:31
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    rent-seeking; coordination games; welfare losses; collective action.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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