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Selection Between Pareto-optimal Outcomes in Two-Person Bargaining With and Without the right to Make a Proposal

Author

Listed:
  • Bodo Vogt

    (Institut f³r Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universitõt Bielefeld, Germany)

  • Wulf Albers

    (Institut f³r Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universitõt Bielefeld, Germany)

Abstract

The selection between Pareto-optimal outcomes in two-person bargaining with the right to make a proposal and without this right are considered. Concepts for the selection without the right to make a proposal are the Nash criterion, the Kalai-Smorodinsky criterion, the egalitarian solution, the equal-loss solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky criterion modified by prominence aspects. A model for the selection if one player can make an ultimatum proposal is the modified Kalai-Smorodinsky criterion with adapted Bliss point. Experiments using the strategy method were performed to test the predictions of the different models. The results support the modified Kalai-Smorodinsky criteria for the corresponding situations.

Suggested Citation

  • Bodo Vogt & Wulf Albers, 2001. "Selection Between Pareto-optimal Outcomes in Two-Person Bargaining With and Without the right to Make a Proposal," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 18, pages 77-90.
    • Handle: RePEc:hom:homoec:v:18:y:2001:p:77-90
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