Core Beliefs and the Founding of the American Republic

In his book on Federalism, published in 1964, William H. Riker proposed an empirical law governing the initiation of the federal bargain: politicians, who agree to the federal bargain, giving up some independence for the sake of union, are willing to do so only because of some external military diplomatic threat or opportunity. Riker suggested that the threat by Spain after the Revolutionary War, to close New Orleans, was indeed such a threat to the Confederation of the U.S. I argue here that Riker's intuition was correct, not only for the ratification period of 1787-1788, but also at the Declaration of Independence. Riker's argument was that the threat was a necessary cause for ratification. I argue that the necessary cause of the Declaration of 1776 was the costly threat posed by the passing of the Quebec Act of 1774 by the British Parliament. The sufficient cause was this, coupled with the offer of French aid, made prior to July 1776. In 1787, the fear of Spain was the necessary cause, while Madison's successful arguments, on mitigating the effects of faction, can be seen as the sufficient cause of ratification. After the Spanish threat receded in 1790 or so, the seeming necessity of centralized federal institutions also weakened, and led to the disagreements between Federalists on the one hand and Jeffersonian Republicans on the other.