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Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good Game

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  • Luca Corazzini
  • Marcelo Tyszler

Abstract

By using data from a voluntary contribution mechanism experiment with heterogeneous endowments and asymmetric information, we estimate a quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model to assess the relative importance of efficiency concerns versus noise in accounting for subjects overcontribution in public good games. In the benchmark specification, homogeneous agents, overcontribution is mainly explained by error and noise in behavior. Results change when we consider a more general QRE specification with cross-subject heterogeneity in concerns for (group) efficiency. In this case, we find that the majority of the subjects make contributions that are compatible with the hypothesis of preference for (group) efficiency. A likelihood-ratio test confirms the superiority of the more general specification of the QRE model over alternative specifications.

Suggested Citation

  • Luca Corazzini & Marcelo Tyszler, 2015. "Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good Game," Journal of Applied Mathematics, Hindawi, vol. 2015, pages 1-8, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:hin:jnljam:961930
    DOI: 10.1155/2015/961930
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