This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Monitoring, Financial Distress, and the Structure of Commercial Lending Syndicates

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Sang Whi Lee
Donald J. Mullineaux
Abstract

We examine the size and composition of commercial lending syndicates. Syndicates are smaller and more concentrated when there is little information about the borrower, when credit risk is relatively high, and when a loan is secured. This suggests syndicates are structured to enhance monitoring efforts and to facilitate renegotiation if borrowers become financially distressed. Since loan sales can change a syndicate’s structure, lead banks often constrain such activity. Limiting resales results in larger, more diffuse syndicates at the loan origination stage, however. Syndicates also grow larger and more diffuse when arrangers are more reputable, when loans have longer terms to maturity, and when borrowers hold more growth options. Our results are robust in a sample restricted to borrowers with traded equity or with credit ratings. The findings for composition likewise are robust when we control for potential endogeneity bias and for the influence of syndicate size on composition.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Financial Management Association in its journal Financial Management.

Volume (Year): 33 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (Fall)
Pages:
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:fma:fmanag:leemullineaux04

Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of South Florida 4202 E. Fowler Ave. COBA #3331 Tampa, FL 33620
Phone: 813-974-2084
Fax: 813-974-3318
Web page: http://www.fma.org/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Lanie Anderson).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Graff, Richard A. & Kairys, Jr. Joseph P., 2005. "Property Rights, Risk and Leverage," Working Papers in Economics 183, Göteborg University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Evan Gatev & Philip Strahan, 2008. "Liquidity Risk and Syndicate Structure," NBER Working Papers 13802, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Christophe J. Godlewski, 2008. "Banking Environment, Agency Costs, and Loan Syndication : A Cross-Country Analysis," Working Papers of LaRGE (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie) 2008-08, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie, Université Louis Pasteur, Strasbourg (France). [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can use convenient plug-ins to search directly IDEAS from your browser.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-19.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.