Gerhard Speckbacher, Paul Wentges () (University of Ulm, Germany)
Abstract
According to Zingales (1999), corporate governance is defined as the complex set of constraints that shape the ex-post bargaining over the quasi-rents generated by a fim. This paper argues that corporate cash holdings and dividend policy can be used as soft constraints in this regard in order to mitigate the holdup situation of corporate stakeholders and to enhance incentives for firm-specific investments in the face of high total firm risk. Hence stakehloder theory contributes to answering the question why firms choose conservative financial policies.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Did you know? You can create a compilation of all publications of a group of people, say alumni of a program, your students or memers of an association.