Il problema dell'evasione fiscale: opinioni e comportamenti
AbstractTax Evasion: Individual Opinions and Behaviour The literature about the determinants of fiscal evasion has highlighted the importance of psychological and moral factors, in addition to economic factors (Gordon, 1989; Bordignon, 1993; Sandmo, 2005; Kahan, 2006). Most studies have analysed fiscal morality using individual opinions drawn from sample surveys. On the contrary, the main contribution of this work is to analyse both individual behaviour towards fiscal duties and individual opinions about tax evasion using data from the 2004 Bank of Italy survey. In this respect, this work uses two different proxies to single out tax evaders. The main results are consistent with previous studies. Furthermore, most tax evaders exhibit reciprocal motivations (that is to say, most individuals believe that those around them evade, and the resentment for this inhibits them from complying) and disappointment in Government expenditures.
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Volume (Year): 2008/94 (2008)
Issue (Month): 94 ()
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