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Ruling minorities within groups of companies and their problems: Proposals from the European literature, 1776-1976

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  • Annalisa Baldissera

Abstract

The author aims to find the systematic causal links between majorities and minor-ities, especially to demonstrate how, even as corporate governance systems change, the same links remained unchanged, at least starting from the original forms of limited liability (colonial) companies. The main cause of the oppression of minorities lies in the power of control, which instead of belonging to the major-ity of share capital holders, is held by close minority shareholders. For this pur-pose, the author presents a historical reconstruction of the problem concerning the balance of powers between dominant minorities and disjoint majorities within the groups of companies.

Suggested Citation

  • Annalisa Baldissera, 2019. "Ruling minorities within groups of companies and their problems: Proposals from the European literature, 1776-1976," CONTABILIT? E CULTURA AZIENDALE, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 0(1), pages 31-59.
    • Handle: RePEc:fan:ccadaa:v:html10.3280/cca2019-001003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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