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Rechtseconomische analyse van de handhavingsnood in het milieubeleid

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Author Info

  • S. Rousseau
  • C.M. Billiet

Abstract

This interdisciplinary analysis focuses on a simple law & economics model of environmental law enforcement. We investigate why certain firms violate environmental regulations in two problem settings (binary and continuous) and which factors determine their compliance decision. The basic model shows that the costs and benefits of enforcement have to be considered jointly and that the total net benefits from enforcing environmental policies are maximal if the marginal cost of enforcement equals its marginal benefit. It is important to clearly show to a broad audience that optimal enforcement does not have to imply maximal enforcement. Even though this insight is quite easily to convey in a theoretical framework by using a simple model, it is much harder to calculate optimal enforcement in real life applications. However, by considering some simple recommendations, the legislator can make a substantial difference to the enforcement policy and significantly improve its cost effectiveness.

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File URL: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/tem/jaargangen/2001-2010/2008/RBE%202008-2/2008-2%20-%20Rousseau-Billiet.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen in its journal Review of Business and Economics.

Volume (Year): LIII (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 188-217

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Handle: RePEc:ete:revbec:20080205

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Postal: Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven
Web page: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be
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Related research

Keywords: Environmental Regulation; Monitoring and Enforcement; Law & Economics; Violation Costs; Regulation Management;

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