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Abuse of Dominant Position on Digital Market: Is the European Commission Going back to the Old Paradigm?

Author

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  • Daria Kostecka-Jurczyk

Abstract

Purpose: The study concerns abuse of a dominant position on digital markets on the example of practices used by Google. The main purpose of the article is to draw attention to the lack of appropriate tools for assessing abuse of a dominant position in such markets. Methodology: The article was prepared based on the method of analyzing documents (mainly the European Commission and FTC) and literature on competition low and policy. The article also uses legal acts and the guidelines of the European Commission. Findings: The study adopts the hypothesis that the European Commission is limited to instruments created for the needs of mature markets, whose attribute is static competition and not innovation. Such tools are not appropriate to assess the behavior of entrepreneurs on digital markets and should be used in a selective and flexible manner. The Commission's rigid approach to the application of existing mechanisms may harm innovation and expansion of companies operating under dynamic competition. Practical implications: The article critically assesses the approach of the European Commission and indicates the factors that should be considered in assessing the abuse of a dominant position by entrepreneurs on digital markets. Originality/Value: As a result, it was pointed out that abuse of a dominant position on digital markets is a relatively new practice and their antitrust assessment mechanisms have not yet been developed. This study provides a voice in the discussion on how antitrust authorities approach towards the assessment of abuse of dominance on digital markets and their sanctioning. At the same time, it draws attention to the need to develop appropriate tools for assessing a dominant position and then its abuse in markets with dynamic competition and whose main attribute is innovation.

Suggested Citation

  • Daria Kostecka-Jurczyk, 2021. "Abuse of Dominant Position on Digital Market: Is the European Commission Going back to the Old Paradigm?," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(Special 1), pages 120-132.
  • Handle: RePEc:ers:journl:v:xxiv:y:2021:i:special1:p:120-132
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pietro Crocioni, 2018. "On The Relevant Cost Standard For Price–Cost Test In Abuses Of Dominance," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 262-291.
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    3. Robert H. Bork & J. Gregory Sidak, 2012. "What Does The Chicago School Teach About Internet Search And The Antitrust Treatment Of Google?," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(4), pages 663-700.
    4. J. Gregory Sidak, 2008. "Abolishing The Price Squeeze As A Theory Of Antitrust Liability," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 279-309.
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    6. Gunnar Niels, 2019. "Transaction Versus Non-Transaction Platforms: A False Dichotomy In Two-Sided Market Definition," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(2-3), pages 327-357.
    7. John M Yun, 2018. "Understanding Google’S Search Platform And The Implications For Antitrust Analyses," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 311-329.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Abuse of dominant position; competition policy; dominant position; digital market; exclusionary practices.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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