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The enemy votes: Weapons improvisation and bargaining failure

Author

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  • Garrett Wood

    (George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA)

Abstract

Belligerents could in principle avoid the ex post costs of conflict by revealing all private information about their violent capabilities and then calculating odds of success ex ante. Incentives to misrepresent private information for strategic gain, however, can cause miscalculations that lead to war. I argue some private information can lead to miscalculation not because it is purposefully misrepresented for strategic gain but because it is too decentralized to be easily revealed. The decentralized private information that produces improvised weapons requires a process of discovering suitable local resources and battlefield testing driven by local military entrepreneurs which frustrates information revelation. Decentralized private information used to improvise new weapons and capabilities like those which emerged in Afghanistan and Iraq show that it can take many years, decades, or even an indeterminate amount of time for fighting to reveal relevant information about violent capabilities.

Suggested Citation

  • Garrett Wood, 2018. "The enemy votes: Weapons improvisation and bargaining failure," Economics of Peace and Security Journal, EPS Publishing, vol. 13(1), pages 35-42, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:epc:journl:v:13:y:2018:i:1:p:35-42
    DOI: 10.15355/epsj.13.1.35
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    File URL: http://www.epsjournal.org.uk/index.php/EPSJ/article/view/300
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Coyne,Christopher J., 2020. "Defense, Peace, and War Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108724036.
    2. Garrett R. Wood, 2019. "Crowdfunding defense," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 451-467, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining failure; improvized weapons; private information; decentralized information; discovery;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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