¿Son compatibles los ideales científicos con los intereses personales? Una aplicación de la teoría de juegos
AbstractIs the reward system efficient to achieve that scientists take the research decisions that contribute most to the epistemic growth of their discipline? This paper approaches this question with regard to a wide class of games. By means of some very simple examples, it shows how easily it may happen that incentives get distorted, even if all members of the scientific community share a common epistemic point of view, every obtained result is published, there are not redundant results, contributions are evaluated by direct inspection, and scientists are rewarded according to their relative performance.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos in its journal Estudios Económicos.
Volume (Year): 16 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rocío Contreras).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.