Theoretical approaches on the possible existence of a stabilising economic policy in Europe

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether there is room for a stabilising fiscal policy, through an analysis of the supporters of the new classical economics and the supporters of the new Keynesian economics. There are no reliable results on the Keynesian and non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policies. As such, the policy-mix becomes a problem of theoretical approach, in the sense of a strategic game between monetary authorities and tax authorities (among them). This points to the problem of coordination between budgetary authorities as being the central debate within the Eurozone. The end-result is that without fiscal policy coordination, Eurozone member states are working on a series of non-cooperative games that are inefficient, because no player can improve its position by unilaterally changing its strategy. Design/methodology/approach - The analysis starts from the experience of three countries in the 1980s, these are Denmark, Ireland and Sweden. In all three cases the adoption of restrictive budget policies has provoked a strong, rapid and enduring resizing of public debt, and growth did not weaken, moreover it accelerated. In all three cases the logic behind the policy-mix actions allowed the individualisation of the respective roles of fiscal and monetary policies. Fiscal policies were joining with fiscal instruments and reduction in public spending and furthermore monetary policy was accommodated in respect of the budget contraction. Findings - First, the authors were not able to identify an analytical method that can ensure the success of a fiscal policy. Second, analysing fiscal policies within the Eurozone implies also that the authors reflect on the need for a coordination of these policies. In fact, the authors have shown how the possible coordination of economic policies in the Eurozone would result in major benefits for all member countries. Originality/value - In the absence of fiscal policy coordination, member states are engaged in a series of non-cooperative games that prove inefficient, when no player is able to improve its position by unilaterally changing its fiscal policy. The coordination of national fiscal policies generates a collective advantage, bringing each state to consistently change its strategies.