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Corporate governance structure and capital adequacy: implications to bank risk taking

Author

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  • Heba Abou-El-Sood

Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to show the importance of policy discussions on the role of governance in limiting excessive risk-taking at times of turmoil. Design/methodology/approach - Corporate governance measures are regressed on measures of risk taking using a sample of US bank holding companies (BHCs) during 2002-2014. Findings - Results show that BHCs with more concentrated shareholders, more managerial ownership, smaller boards, and less outside directors undertake less risky investments with respect to total assets, loans, and off-balance-sheet items. Capital adequacy effect is overpowering pushing for more risky positions. Finally, banks with good governance push for less risky positions, even with larger capital ratios, during the financial crisis period relative to the precrisis boom. Practical implications - This paper extends research on the association between bank ownership structure and risk taking. It adds to prior research by examining a key feature of banks, namely, their bank-specific capital adequacy. The relevance of this study stems from recent initiatives undertaken by the Basel Committee, the Group of Thirty (G30), and bank regulators to address deficient corporate governance structures that led to bank breakdowns. Originality/value - One of the innovations of this paper is the use of risk-weighted measures to proxy for risk taking in banks, using risk weights used by bank regulators to adjust for operational risk, credit risk, and market risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Heba Abou-El-Sood, 2017. "Corporate governance structure and capital adequacy: implications to bank risk taking," International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 13(2), pages 165-185, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eme:ijmfpp:ijmf-04-2016-0078
    DOI: 10.1108/IJMF-04-2016-0078
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Diyan Lestari, 2018. "Corporate Governance, Capital Reserve, Non-Performing Loan, and Bank Risk Taking," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 8(2), pages 25-32.
    2. Sophia Velez & Michael Neubert & Daphne Halkias, 2020. "Banking Finance Experts Consensus on Compliance in US Bank Holding Companies: An e-Delphi Study," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 13(2), pages 1-14, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial crisis; Banks; Corporate governance; Capital adequacy; Risk taking; G21; G28; G30; G32; M41; G01;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises

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