Brokers’ list price setting in an auction context

Purpose - The role of list price is often discussed in a narrative describing sellers’ preferences or sellers’ price expectations. This paper aims to investigate a set of list price strategies that real estate brokers have available to influence the outcome of the sale, which may be many times self-serving. Design/methodology/approach - By analyzing real estate brokers’ arguments on the choice of the list price level, a couple of hypotheses are formulated with regard to different expected outcomes that depend on the list price. This study empirically tests two hypotheses for the underlying incentives in the choice of list price from the real estate broker’s perspective: lower list price compared to market value leads to the higher sales price, lower list price compared to market value leads to a quicker sale. To investigate the two hypotheses, this paper adopts different methodological frameworks:H1is tested by running a classical hedonic model, whileH2is tested through a duration model. This study further tests the hypotheses by splitting the full sample into two different price segments: above and below the median list price. Findings - The results show thatH1is rejected for the full sample and for the two sub-samples. That is, contrary to the common narrative among brokers that underpricing leads to a higher sales price, underpricing lower sales price.H2, however, receives support for the full sample and for the two sub-samples. The latter result points to that brokers may be tempted to recommend a list price significantly below the expected selling price to minimize their effort while showing a high turnover of apartments. Originality/value - Although there are a large number of previous studies analyzing list price strategies in the housing market, this paper is one of the few empirical studies that address the effect of list price choice level on auction outcomes of non-distressed housing sales.