IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eme/cfripp/cfri-07-2015-0109.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The impact of the reputation of underwriter and sponsoring representative on IPO underwriting fees

Author

Listed:
  • Chao Chen
  • Xinrong Wang

Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of the reputation of underwriters and sponsoring representatives on initial public offering (IPO) underwriting fees, and further investigates the role of ownership and political connection. Design/methodology/approach - The methodology includes three models. Model 1 empirically investigates the effect of underwriter’s reputation on underwriting fee. Model 2 studies the effect of sponsoring representative’s reputation on underwriting fee. Model 3 further examines the effect of underwriter’s reputation and sponsoring representative reputation on the underwriting fee controlling for the impact of ultimate controlling ownership and political connection. Findings - The study documents that underwriters’ and sponsoring representatives’ reputation can result in reputational premiums. In the IPO of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the reputation of underwriters and sponsoring representatives does not significantly affect the underwriting fees. In the IPO of non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs), there is a significantly positive correlation between underwriters’ and sponsoring representatives’ reputation and underwriting fees. Further research results show that, on the one hand, the effect of underwriters’ and sponsoring representatives’ reputation on underwriting fees is not significant in the IPO of NSOEs with political connection. On the other hand, underwriting fees are positively associated with underwriters’ and sponsoring representatives’ reputation in the IPO of NSOEs without political connection. Research limitations/implications - The sponsoring representative’s fee is not disclosed separately, which makes it difficult to distinguish the incremental effect from underwriter’s services and reputation. Practical implications - NSOEs relative to SOEs are more likely to pay higher underwriting fees for hiring underwriter and sponsoring representative with better reputation during the process of IPO. Social implications - The reputation of underwriter and sponsoring representative does not matter to SOEs but does matter to NSOEs. However, NSOEs’ political connection affects underwriter fees. Originality/value - This paper provides new evidence of sponsoring representatives’ reputation and political connection on the underwriting fees in the IPO in Chinese SOEs and NSOEs.

Suggested Citation

  • Chao Chen & Xinrong Wang, 2016. "The impact of the reputation of underwriter and sponsoring representative on IPO underwriting fees," China Finance Review International, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 6(4), pages 342-366, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eme:cfripp:cfri-07-2015-0109
    DOI: 10.1108/CFRI-07-2015-0109
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/CFRI-07-2015-0109/full/html?utm_source=repec&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=repec
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

    File URL: https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/CFRI-07-2015-0109/full/pdf?utm_source=repec&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=repec
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1108/CFRI-07-2015-0109?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gao, Ya & Xiong, Xiong & Feng, Xu, 2020. "Responsible investment in the Chinese stock market," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    2. Liu, Ye & Liu, Jingzhe & Ai, Wei & Wang, Zengxiang & An, Yunbi, 2022. "Agency conflicts in co-regulation: Evidence from IPO application screening in China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    3. Gao, Ya & Liao, Chi & Zhang, Ying & Zhang, Zixu, 2021. "The role of investor protections on the value of investment banking relationships: International evidence," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Reputation; Political connection; Sponsoring representative; Underwriter; Underwriting fee; G14; G24; G32;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eme:cfripp:cfri-07-2015-0109. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Emerald Support (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.