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Fundamentos de la nueva fórmula de asignación del Fondo de Aportaciones para la Infraestructura Social en México

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  • Ibarra Salazar, Jorge

    (Escuela de Ciencias Sociales y Gobierno del Tecnológico de Monterrey y profesor visitante del Departamento de Economía de la Southern Methodist University)

Abstract

Background. The Social Infrastructure Fund (FAIS), created since 1998, is a conditional transfer distributed by the Mexican federal government between state and municipal governments to reduce poverty. The assignation formula used until 2013, distributed the Fund according to the relative poverty of each state in relation to the national poverty. This design did not generate the appropriate incentives to reduce poverty. Methods. Based on a principal–agent model, and explicitly acknowledging the informational asymmetry between the federal and sub national levels of government, in this paper we propose a formula to assign the Fund, which has two fundamental characteristics: the FAIS is distributed using the relative poverty of states / municipalities; and includes a component to avoid the perverse incentive of the formula used until 2013. Results. A mechanism is designed and used as the theoretical basis to construct a formula to assign the transfer. Conclusions. In order to achieve the proposed impact of the governmental programs financed with federal transfers, it is important to design and implement the mechanisms to align the incentives of the different governmental levels.//Antecedentes. El Fondo de Aportaciones para la Infraestructura Social (FAIS), instituido a partir de 1998, es una transferencia condicionada que distribuye el gobierno federal mexicano entre los estados y municipios para reducir la pobreza. La fórmula de asignación usada hasta 2013 distribuía este fondo de acuerdo con la pobreza relativa de cada estado en relación con la nacional. Este diseño no generaba los incentivos adecuados para reducir la pobreza. Métodos. Con base en un modelo agente-principal, y considerando explícitamente la asimetría de información entre los órdenes de gobierno federal y subnacional, en este artículo se propone una fórmula de asignación del FAIS, que tiene dos características fundamentales: se distribuye con base en la pobreza relativa de los estados/municipios; y contiene un componente para evitar el incentivo perverso de la fórmula de distribución que se usó hasta 2013. Resultados. Se diseña un mecanismo que se usa como fundamento teórico en la construcción de una fórmula para distribuir la transferencia. Conclusiones. Para lograr el impacto deseado de los programas gubernamentales que se financian con transferencias federales es importante diseñar e implementar mecanismos que alineen los incentivos de los diferentes niveles de gobierno.

Suggested Citation

  • Ibarra Salazar, Jorge, 2018. "Fundamentos de la nueva fórmula de asignación del Fondo de Aportaciones para la Infraestructura Social en México," El Trimestre Económico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, vol. 0(337), pages .195-218, enero-mar.
  • Handle: RePEc:elt:journl:v:85:y:2018:i:337:p:195-218
    DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20430/ete.v85i337.664
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    File URL: http://www.eltrimestreeconomico.com.mx/index.php/te/article/view/664/939
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    Keywords

    transferencias condicionadas; FAIS; fórmula de distribución; riesgo moral; modelo agente-principal; pobreza;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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