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Bargaining framework for competitive green supply chains under governmental financial intervention

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  • Sheu, Jiuh-Biing
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    Abstract

    This work investigates the problem of negotiations between producers and reverse-logistics (RL) suppliers for cooperative agreements under government intervention. Utilizing the asymmetrical Nash bargaining game with uncertainties, this work seeks equilibrium negotiation solutions to player agendas. Analytical results indicate that financial intervention by a government generates a significant effect on the relative bargaining power of green supply chain members in negotiations. Over intervention by a government may result in adverse effects on chain members' profits and social welfare. Furthermore, a bargaining framework underlying the duopoly-oligopoly context may contribute to a negotiation outcome most profitable for green supply chain members.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review.

    Volume (Year): 47 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 5 (September)
    Pages: 573-592

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:transe:v:47:y:2011:i:5:p:573-592

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/600244/description#description

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    Related research

    Keywords: Green supply chain cooperation Bilateral negotiation Nash bargaining game Government's financial instruments;

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    Cited by:
    1. Sheu, Jiuh-Biing & Gao, Xiao-Qin, 2014. "Alliance or no alliance—Bargaining power in competing reverse supply chains," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 233(2), pages 313-325.
    2. Chen, Jen-Ming & Chang, Chia-I, 2012. "The co-opetitive strategy of a closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 387-400.
    3. Chen, Yenming J. & Sheu, Jiuh-Biing & Lirn, Taih-Cherng, 2012. "Fault tolerance modeling for an e-waste recycling supply chain," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 897-906.
    4. Mihi Ramírez, Antonio, 2012. "Product return and logistics knowledge: Influence on performance of the firm," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 1137-1151.
    5. Jiuh-Biing Sheu, 2014. "Green Supply Chain Collaboration for Fashionable Consumer Electronics Products under Third-Party Power Intervention—A Resource Dependence Perspective," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 6(5), pages 2832-2875, May.

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