IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v230y2024ics0047272723002438.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

No-claim refunds and healthcare use

Author

Listed:
  • Avdic, Daniel
  • Decker, Simon
  • Karlsson, Martin
  • Salm, Martin

Abstract

No-claim refunds are cost-control instruments which stipulate a payback agreement contingent on one or more claim-free years. We study how such no-claim refunds affect claiming behavior using claims data from a large German health insurer and a policy that increased the refund size for certain plans. We propose a method to decompose the effect on claims into behavioral and non-behavioral components, and show that individuals responded to the refund policy by reducing claims by eight percent on average. The effect persisted for several years; behavioral responses were stronger for clients with more to gain from the policy; and reductions in claims were not restricted to treatments of questionable medical value.

Suggested Citation

  • Avdic, Daniel & Decker, Simon & Karlsson, Martin & Salm, Martin, 2024. "No-claim refunds and healthcare use," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 230(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:230:y:2024:i:c:s0047272723002438
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.105061
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272723002438
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.105061?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    No-claim refund; Moral hazard; Health insurance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:230:y:2024:i:c:s0047272723002438. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.