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The impact of investor-level taxation on mergers and acquisitions

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  • Ohrn, Eric
  • Seegert, Nathan

Abstract

When capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than dividends, the difference in rates creates a tax discount on mergers and acquisitions. The intuition is that if a target firm's assets are subject to the higher dividend tax rate, but the proceeds from the sale of these assets are taxed at the lower capital gains rate, there is a tax preference to be acquired. Using quasi-experimental variation created by the Jobs Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, we show that this tax discount increases the quantity and decreases the quality of acquisitions made by dividend-paying firms with taxable shareholders. Our estimates suggest that re-implementing the same wedge between dividend and capital gains rates that the 2003 reform eliminated would destroy approximately $59 billion of the value of mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. annually.

Suggested Citation

  • Ohrn, Eric & Seegert, Nathan, 2019. "The impact of investor-level taxation on mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 1-1.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:177:y:2019:i:c:1
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.06.006
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dautović, Ernest & Gambacorta, Leonardo & Reghezza, Alessio, 2023. "Supervisory policy stimulus: evidence from the euro area dividend recommendation," Working Paper Series 2796, European Central Bank.
    2. Bradley, Sebastien & Carril-Caccia, Federico & Yotov, Yoto, 2023. "Reassessing the Effects of Corporate Income Taxes on Mergers and Acquisitions Using Empirical Advances in the Gravity Literature," School of Economics Working Paper Series 2023-8, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University.
    3. Aria Ardalan & Sebastian G. Kessing & Salmai Qari & Malte Zoubek, 2023. "Does capital bear the burden of local corporate taxes? Evidence from Germany," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 194-23, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
    4. Todtenhaupt, Maximilian & Voget, Johannes & Feld, Lars P. & Ruf, Martin & Schreiber, Ulrich, 2020. "Taxing away M&A: Capital gains taxation and acquisition activity," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    5. Feld, Lars P. & Ruf, Martin & Schreiber, Ulrich & Todtenhaupt, Maximilian & Voget, Johannes, 2016. "Taxing away M&A: The effect of corporate capital gains taxes on acquisition activity," ZEW Discussion Papers 16-007, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    6. Byoung-Kuk Ju & Seung-Hoon Yoo & Chulwoo Baek, 2022. "Economies of Scale in City Gas Sector in Seoul, South Korea: Evidence from an Empirical Investigation," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(9), pages 1-14, April.
    7. Axel Prettl & Dominik Hagen, 2023. "Multinational ownership patterns and anti-tax avoidance legislation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 30(3), pages 565-634, June.
    8. Adrien Matray & Charles Boissel, 2020. "Higher Dividend Taxes, No Problem! Evidence from Taxing Entrepreneurs in France," Working Papers 276, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mergers and acquisitions; Corporate taxation;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies

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