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An effective intervention algorithm for promoting cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game with multiple stable states

Author

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  • Li, Y.S.
  • Xu, C.
  • Hui, P.M.

Abstract

Multiple stable states, hysteresis, sensitivity to initial distributions, and a control algorithm for promoting cooperation are studied in an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma with agents connected into a regular random network. A system could evolve into states of different cooperative frequencies xc in different runs, even starting with the same initial cooperative frequency xc(in) and payoff parameters. For a large reward R, some values of xc(in) either take the system to a group of low cooperative frequency (LCF) states or to a few high cooperative frequency (HCF) states. These states differ by their network structures, with cooperative players connected into ring-like structure in LCF states and compact clusters in HCF states. Hysteresis in xc is observed when R is swept down and up, when the final state of the previous R is used as the initial state of the next R. The analysis led us to propose a closed pack cluster algorithm that gives HCF states effectively. The algorithm intervenes the system at some point in time by selectively switching some non-cooperative D-agents into cooperative C-agents at the peripheral of an existing cluster of C-agents. It ensures protection of a small C-cluster from which more cooperation can be induced. Practically, a governing body may first allow a society to evolve freely and then derive suitable policy to promote selected pockets of good practices for attaining a higher level of common good.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, Y.S. & Xu, C. & Hui, P.M., 2018. "An effective intervention algorithm for promoting cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game with multiple stable states," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 501(C), pages 400-407.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:501:y:2018:i:c:p:400-407
    DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2018.02.055
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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Xianjia & Chen, Wenman, 2020. "Evolutionary dynamics in spatial threshold public goods game with the asymmetric return rate mechanism," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).

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